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When Louis Dupree last Christmas 
Eve asked me if I would like to contribute 
an article about Afghanistan to a forth- 
coming issue of Refuge, I was honoured 
and accepted the offer willingly. Louis 
suggested the title "ACBAR and 
SWABAC: a Unique Experiment in NGO 
co-ordination". 
Last Christmas was a time of hopes 
and expectations. The Soviets were just 
about to complete their withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, and most of us believed that 
the war would soon be over. TV crews 
and journalists thronged all over 
Peshawar, preparing themselves for the 
big scoop, wh'en the last Soviets would 
leave Kabul hanging from the last heli- 
copter. The international aid apparatus 
was gearing up its heavy machinery, 
although "Operation Salaam", the UN 
body which had been established seven 
months earlier with the purpose of co- 
ordinating aid to Afghanistan, had diffi- 
culties in-getting its-feet planted in the 
field. The Agency Coordinating Body for 
Afghan Relief (ACBAR), an umbrella 
organization in Peshawar encompassing 
over 50 non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and the Southwestern 
Afghanistan and Baluchistan Agency for 
Coordination (SWABAC), a sister organi- 
zation with a membership of 15 NGOs 
based in Quetta, had been created ivith the 
purpose of coordinating the work of the 
NGOs. They had also problems in getting 
their practical act together. Nevertheless, 
the air was filled with enthusiasm and a 
kind of pioneering spirit: meetings suc- 
ceeded meetings and everyone in the aid 
community was discussing problems 
related to the anticipated repatriation of 
the refugees and the rehabilitation of the 
country. We were all in for a very big p b  
and the eyes of the world were upon us. 
However, since last Christmas a lot of 
things have happened, others not. To men- 
tion a few; the Red Army did leave 
Afghanistan, but the war did not cease. 
Instead of peace came the battle for 
Jelalabad, and instead of repatriation a 
multitude of new refugees poured over 
the border. The TV crews and the purnal- 
ists disappeared, but the aid workers are 
still here. They continue their work; at a 
slightly slower pace, with a little less 
enthusiasm and, perhaps, a more sober 
view towards the future. Nevertheless, it 
was a period of learning. The UN and its 
agencies learned a little about the peculiar- 
ities of Afghanistan and the NGOs learned 
how to do the paper work in order to get 
funds from the UN. We also learned that 
it is very difficult to co-ordinate 70-odd 
NGOs and that ACBAR and SWABAC 
were not quite as  unique a s  we had 
believed them to be, that other efforts of 
co-ordination between NGOs had been 
carried out elsewhere. 
So, when the time finally came to 
write this article, I felt that the title which 
Louis had suggested was somewhat out of 
date. Besides, the only thing which is real- 
ly unique in this specific context of aid is 
Afghanistan itself, and that any effort 
aimed to understand the problems of the 
NGOs and the rest of the aid community 
in Afghanistan has to begin with Afghan 
society itself and, especially, the profound 
change in the political conditions which 
started with the Communist coup &&at in 
April 1978. That is why the title was 
changed, and I am quite certain that Louis 
would have agreed with the change. 
The Limitations 
We always tend to look upon the 
world through glasses coloured by our 
own political and cultural experiences. To 
an extent it is unavoidable, but the prob- 
lem increases undoubtedly the higher up 
in the bureaucracies we get. The closer to 
heaven, the less understanding of what 
actually is going on, of the problems and 
the specific conditions in a certain environ- 
ments. In this regard, Afghanistan is no 
unique case. The misconceptions are 
many. One, which concerns aid, is the 
belief that it is somehow possible to exe- 
cute conventional, large-scale and massive 
aid operations in Afghanistan. That is not 
the case. However, this is not the same 
thing as to say that it is impossible to orga- 
nize humanitarian aid efforts at all. Aid 
operations are carried out right at this 
moment and it has been done by NGOs 
since the beginning of the war. The crucial 
point is to understand both the limitations 
and the possibilities of aid in the extremely 
politicized environment of Afghanistan. 
The War 
To start with the most obvious, the 
war not only created the need for a large 
international aid effort through the 
immense destruction it has brought upon 
the land and its people., but it represents, 
at the same time, one of the most funda- 
mental obstacles to any such large-scale 
operation. War is an anathema to human- 
ism . In any armed conflict, especially 
when it has been as uncompromising and 
as long as in Afghanistan, there is a strong 
tendency among the contending parties to 
give priority to their own political interests 
at the expense of the interests of the 
common man. 
Consequently, since the war has 
divided Afghanistan into two antagonistic 
parts, there are two ways to get aid into 
the country, and both of them are limited. 
One is to work through Kabul, from where 
it is possible to reach those living in the 
cities and in the immediate vicinities of the 
cities. The other is to organize aid from 
Pakistan in co-operation with the resis- 
tance, which dominates the main part of 
the rural areas. 
A Mosaic of Powers 
The second essential obstacle arises 
from the far-reaching changes in the socio- 
political conditions which has taken place 
during the war. Its main characteristic is 
the destruction of state authority and the 
subsequent fragmentation of political 
power. 
Historically, Afghanistan was charac- 
terized by a balance between the state and 
more or less broad power groups based on 
traditional concepts. The popular upris- 
ing which followed the Communist coup 
d'&at in 1978, which accelerated after the 
Soviet invasion, signified the total collapse 
of state control and its replacement by a 
multitude of local units which later coa- 
lesced into a few loosely united regional 
power groups comprised of mujahidin 
(resistance fighters). 
The political parties of the resistance 
have never, in spite of several efforts, been 
able to fill the gap and act as a central 
authority for the areas which are under 
their control. They have been too preoccu- 
pied with factional quarrels and too 
dependent on foreign powers, especially 
Pakistan. With one exception, they are too 
badly organized to provide an alternative, 
and this is also true of the "interim 
government" which was established in 
the beginning of 1989. 
Newly-arrived observers mistakenly 
equate the political parties based in 
Pakistan with the resistance inside 
Afghanistan. They forget that the political 
party is an almost totally new concept in 
Afghan political life, at the most not more 
than 25 years old. There are certainly vari- 
ations between the parties; some are rela- 
tively more efficient, some less, but in gen- 
eral they do not function like centralized 
political parties in the West. They exercise 
a limited control of the resistance inside 
the country. The local or regional com- 
manders are, in the end, their own mas- 
ters, who independently take care of their 
own matters and play their own political 
games. As a result, most party leaders do 
not even try to direct them. 
There are all sorts of commanders 
inside Afghanistan: traditional and mod- 
ern; fanatics and open-minded; educated 
and illiterates; corrupt and honest; smart 
and stupid. Some organize their people to 
carry out reconstruction work, establish 
clinics and schools, clean imgation chan- 
nels, provide seed and fertilizer. There are 
groups loosely linked together through 
ethnic group, clan or tribal loyalties, while 
others function, quite simply, within their 
own extended family. Then, there are com- 
manders who, in co-operation with other 
commanders and traditional power 
groups, rule over large areas in which they 
have established functioning administra- 
tive systems with thousands of disciplined, 
well-organized mujahidin. Most com- 
manders are against the Kabul regime, but 
a few leap back and forth between the 
mujahidin and the "government". 
Finally, there are "Peshawar comman- 
ders", an honorary title given to former 
commanders who have not trampled 
Afghan soil for the last five years and who 
often make a living from cheating aid 
agencies in Peshawar. 
Undoubtedly, the commanders are 
the strongest and at the same time the 
most unpredictable political force in 
Afghanistan today. They exemplify the 
fact that the Afghan resistance is both 
united under the banner of Islam, but also 
fragmented between ethnic, tribal, reli- 
gious and political allegiances. They are 
the product of the war and their power 
increased throughout the war. On the 
other hand, they will not cease to exist 
when peace comes. For some of them, the 
future might bring influential positions in 
the establishment which will arise out of 
the war. A few will revert to banditism, 
but, hopefully, the great majority will con- 
tinue to be responsible Afghan citizens, 
working with traditional local groups in 
the villages. Gradually, local groups will 
have to cope with an emerging central 
authority, provided that such an authority 
can obtain the formal approval of the local 
groups. This, however, will not necessari- 
ly mean that the commanders will hand 
over their weapons, dissolve their groups 
and happily return to the life they enjoyed 
before the war. They have been used to 
running their own affairs for ten years, 
and they will not voluntarily give up these 
prerogatives. 
Thus, the second conclusion is that 
the fragmentation of political power sig- 
nificantly limits the possibility of carrying 
out conventional large-scale aid opera- 
tions. In concrete terms this means that 
the aid community does not have one 
counterpart but, rather, h u n d d s  of them. 
Moreover, this situation will probably con- 
tinue for the foreseeable future, even if 
there is a government established which 
has even a nominal acceptance of the 
Afghan people. 
Destruction and the 
Lack of Human Resources 
After ten years of war, Afghanistan 
and the Afghan people have suffered 
enormously. Figures like five million 
refugees, more than a million dead, and 
an agricultural production which in 1987 
had decreased to 52% compared to 1978, 
not counting abandoned farms, give 
strong evidence of a total war effort large- 
ly directed against the civilian population. 
There are no statistics available on infras- 
tructure, but reports, as well as the above- 
mentioned figures, indicate widespread 
and serious devastation. 
The brain drain has reached critical 
proportions. Huge numbers of Afghan 
intellectuals have been imprisoned, tor- 
tured, killed or just simply vanished. 
Thousands have sought refuge in Saudi 
Arabia, the Gulf States and in the West, 
and still others have been preoccupied 
with military or political tasks. Refugee 
students trained in the educational system 
of the Kabul regime do not meet elemen- 
tary standards. Aid agencies, therefore, 
have great difficultiy in finding trained 
Afghans for positions in administration or 
any kind of project work, even in the cur- 
rent situation of relatively low levels of 
aid. 
The third conclusion is, consequently, 
that the destroyed infrastructure and the 
lack of human resources severely restrict 
the handling of big amounts of relief 
goods as well as the now much needed 
build up of administrative and project 
implementation capacity. 
The Possibilities 
Limitations and difficulties do not 
exclude possibilities. International aid in 
wartime Afghanistan has been carried out 
mainly through NGO crossborder opera- 
tions from Pakistan. Kabul was not con- 
sidered as an alternative because of politi- 
cal as well as practical considerations. 
NGO work has gone through several 
stages, but for the purpose of this article it 
can be divided into two periods; from the 
beginning of the eighties until the summer 
of 1988, and from that time onwards. 
Crossborder assistance started just 
after the Soviet invasion with the French 
Doctors being the first on the scene. They 
were closely followed by Austrians, other 
French organizations, Swedes, 
Norwegians, the British and Dutch. NGOs 
from different Islamic countries were also 
involved early, and when the US 
Government in 1985 established a humani- 
tarian aid programme in Afghanistan, 
American NGOs followed. 
With a few exceptions, the organiza- 
tions were new and politically-oriented in 
the sense that they took an open stand 
against the Soviet invasion. Many had no 
former experience in relief, not to mention 
development, which meant that pro- 
grammes during the first years were 
rather unsophisticated. On the other 
hand, thanks to their freshness there was 
never any shortage of ideas. Successful 
solutions were often unconventional and 
not hampered by routine opinions, nor by 
an excessive load of administrative work. 
Their strength was engagement, uncon- 
ventional methods and a pragmatic down- 
to-earth approach. Their weakness lay 
generally in poor administration, a lack of 
technical capacity and an exaggerated 
feeling of their own importance, resulting 
in co-ordination difficulties. However, it 
would be unfair to attribute the 
last-mentioned trait only to NGOs. 
To organize programmes for humani- 
tarian assistance in a crossborder situation 
involves a whole range of problems usual- 
ly not found in more normal situations. 
The fact of being stationed in one country 
while carrying out aid in another, particu- 
larly another ravaged by war, means that 
most processes related to project imple- 
mentation are much more complex and 
cumbersome. Communication is not a 
question of haurs, but of days and even 
weeks. You just do not jump into your car, 
drive out to the project, knock at the door 
and spend a few hours with the field per- 
sonnel. The situation is further complicat- 
ed by the fact that the Pakistani govern- 
ment has never officially acknowledged 
the existence of crossborder aid 
operations. 
A specific difficulty is the absence of 
a centralized counterpart. NGOs have 
tried to solve this problem by establishing, 
whenever possible, direct links with local 
and regional authorities inside 
Afghanistan, i.e., in most cases the com- 
manders. Most often it has been done 
with the co-operation of the political par- 
ties in the resistance, though sometimes 
dissatisfaction rises over the fact that the 
aid is not controlled by them. 
A decentralized approach has been 
the most successful. Because conventional 
planning has not been conducted except 
in a very flexible way, it has been possible 
to take fast decisions in the rapidly chang- 
ing environment so as  to seize every 
opportunity as it shows up. It goes with- 
out saying that it has been a long process 
of trial and error which, among other 
things, has resulted in an accumulated and 
profound knowledge about conditions in 
wartime Afghanistan. 
Despite weaknesses, NGOs proved 
during 1980-1988 that it is possible to man- 
age relief in the rural areas of Afghanistan. 
Their primary motivating force was a com- 
mitment to the Afghan people. 
The Arrival of the UN 
Since the Kabul regime occupied the 
chair of Afghanistan in the UN General 
Assembly, the UN initially considered 
itself unable to support aid operations in 
areas controlled by the resistance. This 
changed when the Geneva Accords stipu- 
lated the withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
Shortly after the Accords were signed in 
April 1988 the UN Secretary-General 
appointed Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan 
as the Co-ordinator of all UN assistance to 
Afghanistan, and in June Prince 
Sadruddin launched an appeal for 
Afghanistan in which the figure $1,116 bil- 
lion was mentioned as needed for aid 
during an initial period of 18 months. 
The NGOs in Peshawar were skeptical 
concerning the size of the amount; voicing 
resewations about the lack of an imple- 
mentation capacity. Nonetheless, they 
were also influenced by the possibility of a 
Soviet withdrawal and in August 1988 
ACBAR was formed in Peshawar by 
roughly 40 NGOs working either in 
Afghanistan or among the refugees in 
Pakistan. Soon thereafter SWABAC, a sis- 
ter organization with about 15 NGOs, 
came into being in Quetta. The main pur- 
pose of both organizations was to co-ordi- 
nate NGOs for the purposes of preparing 
for an eventual repatriation of the refugees 
and a reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
For the NGOs working crossborder, 
the co-operation with the UN and its dif- 
ferent agencies was a new experience, but 
in general, cooperation has been above 
expectations, although more or less well- 
founded tensions temporarily occur. 
A Changed Situation in 
Afghanistan 
Radical changes have occurred in 
Afghan rural areas. Huge areas, which 
during the nine years of Soviet occupation 
had been subject to armed conflict, are 
pacified. The terror of war falls now upon 
the population in the cities, while in the 
countryside life goes increasingly back to 
normal. From the Peshawar horizon the 
most noticeable change, perhaps, has to do 
with the conditions in communications. 
One does not travel or transport goods 
with horses or other pack animals any 
more. One goes with trucks or pick-ups, 
and places, which it took weeks to reach, 
are now reached in a day or two. 
The result is that Afghan rural areas, 
to an extent no one could dream of only a 
year ago, have opened up for travel, trade 
and aid operations. The NGOs, with s u p  
port from the UN, can now offer more 
assistance in the rehabilitation of agricul- 
ture, repair of irrigation systems, roads, 
buildings and so on. New and certified 
wheat seed are brought, veterinary as well 
as plant protection services are offered. 
Efforts to establish health care systems 
have become easier. A successful expan- 
sion of the aid work has taken place, 
which makes it most alarming to hear sig- 
nals from some Western governments 
about holding back on funding. It is diffi- 
cult to predict the future, but we know one 
thing for certain: the Afghan people will 
be in great need of help for the foreseeable 
future. The fact that the war continues is 
not an argument against, but rather in 
favour of, that presumption. 
A Model for the Future 
So far, the main channel for the UN- 
agencies into Afghanistan has been sup- 
port for projects run by NGOs. There is a 
need for refining the process and clearly 
defining roles. As long as there is no effec- 
tive central authority in Afghanistan, it is 
consistent that the NGOs, with their more 
pragmatic approach, relatively larger flexi- 
bility and greater experience of field con- 
ditions, take the main burden of actual 
project implementation. It is also consis- 
tent that the UN takes a more forceful part, 
not only in issues like supplies, technical 
and financial support, but in co-ordina- 
tion, monitoring and evaluation. This will 
not only push NGOs to correct their mis- 
takes and upgrade their performances, it 
wil 1 also teach UN personnel about 
conditions in the field. 
The conclusion is simple; the UN 
needs the NGOs and vice versa. But, most 
importantly, the people of Afghanistan 
need them both. 
